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Abstract
This paper considers decentralized control and optimization methodologies for large populations of
systems, consisting of several agents with different individual behaviors, constraints and interests, and
affected by the aggregate behavior of the overall population. For such large-scale systems, the theory
of aggregative and mean field games has been established and successfully applied in various scientific
disciplines. While the existing literature addresses the case of unconstrained agents, we formulate
deterministic mean field control problems in the presence of heterogeneous convex constraints for the
individual agents, for instance arising from agents with linear dynamics subject to convex state and
control constraints. We propose several model-free feedback iterations to compute in a decentralized
fashion a mean field Nash equilibrium in the limit of infinite population size. We apply our methods to
the constrained linear quadratic deterministic mean field control problem and to the constrained mean
field charging control problem for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decentralized control and optimization in large populations of systems are of interest to
various scientific disciplines, such as engineering, mathematics, social sciences, system biology
and economics. A population of systems comprises several interacting heterogeneous agents,
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2each with its own individual dynamic behavior and interest. For the case of small/medium size
populations, such interactions can be analyzed via dynamic noncooperative game theory [1].
On the other hand, for large populations of systems the analytic solution of the game equations
becomes computationally intractable. Aggregative and population games [2], [3], [4], [5] repre-
sent a viable solution method to address large population problems where the behavior of each
agent is affected by some aggregate effect of all the agents, rather than by specific one-to-one
effects. This feature attracts substantial research interest, indeed motivated by several relevant
applications, including demand side management (DSM) for large populations of prosumers in
smart grids [6], [7], [8], [9], charging coordination for large fleets of plug-in electric vehicles
(PEVs) [10], [11], [12], congestion control for networks of shared resources [13], synchronization
of populations of coupled oscillators in power networks [14], [15].
Along these lines, Mean Field (MF) games have emerged as a methodology to study multi-
agent coordination problems where each individual agent is influenced by the statistical distribu-
tion of the population, and its contribution to the population distribution vanishes as the number
of agents grows [16], [17], [18]. Specific research attention has been posed to MF setups where
the effect of the population on each individual agent is given by a weighted average among
the agents’ strategies. Unlike aggregative games, the distinctive feature of MF games is the
emphasis on the limit of infinite population size, as this abstraction allows one to approximate
the average population behavior based on its statistical properties only [16], [17], [18]. In the
most general case, as the number of agents tends to infinity, the coupled interactions among the
agents can be modeled mathematically via a system of two coupled Partial Differential Equations
(PDEs), the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) PDE for the optimal response of each individual
agent [16], [17] and the Fokker–Planck–Kolmogorov (FPK) PDE for the dynamical evolution
of the population distribution [18]. From the computational point of view, in the classical MF
game setups, all the agents need information regarding the statistical properties of the population
behavior to solve the MF equations in a decentralized fashion.
In this paper, we consider deterministic MF games, as in [7], [10], [12], [19], with an infor-
mation structure for the agents which differs from the one of classical MF games. Specifically,
we assume that the agents do not have access to the statistical properties of the population but,
on the contrary, react optimally to a common external signal, which is broadcast by a central
population coordinator. This information structure is typical of many large-scale multi-agent
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3coordination problems, for instance in large fleets of PEVs [10], [11], [12], DSM in smart grids
[6], [8], [9], and congestion control [13]. We then define the mean field control problem as the
task of designing an incentive signal that the central coordinator should broadcast so that the
decentralized optimal responses of the agents satisfy some desired properties, in terms of the
original deterministic MF game. Contrary to the standard approach used to solve MF games, our
MF control approach allow us to compute (almost) Nash equilibria for deterministic MF games in
which the individual agents are subject to heterogeneous convex constraints, for instance arising
from different linear dynamics, convex state and input constraints. Our motivation comes from
the fact that constrained systems arise naturally in almost all engineering applications, playing
an active role in the agent behavior.
In the presence of constraints, the optimal response of each agent is in general not known in
closed form. To overcome this difficulty, we build on mathematical definitions and tools from
convex analysis and operator theory [20], [21], establishing useful regularity properties of the
mapping describing the aggregate population behavior. We solve the constrained deterministic
MF control problem via several specific feedback iterations and show convergence to an incentive
signal generating a MF equilibrium in a decentralized fashion, making our methods scalable as
the population size increases. Analogously to [10], [12], [17], [19], we seek convergence to a
MF Nash equilibrium, that is, we focus on equilibria in which each agent has no interest to
change its strategy, given the aggregate strategy of the others.
The contributions of the paper are hence the following:
• We address the deterministic mean field control problem for populations of agents with
heterogeneous convex constraints.
• We show that the set of optimal responses to an incentive signal that is a fixed point of the
population aggregation mapping gets arbitrarily close to a mean field Nash equilibrium, as
the population size grows.
• We show several regularity properties of the mappings arising in constrained deterministic
mean field control problems.
• We show that specific feedback iterations are suited to solve constrained deterministic mean
field control problems with specific regularity.
• We apply our results to the constrained linear quadratic deterministic mean field control
problem and to the constrained mean field charging control problem for large populations
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4of plug-in electric vehicles, showing extensions to literature results.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents as a motivating example the LQ deter-
ministic MF control problem for agents with linear dynamics, quadratic cost function, convex
state and input constraints. Section III shows the general deterministic MF control problem and
the technical result about the approximation of a MF Nash equilibrium. Section IV contains
the main results, regarding some regularity properties of parametric convex programs arising
in deterministic MF problems and the decentralized convergence to a MF Nash equilibrium
of specific feedback iterations. Section V discusses two applications of our technical results;
it revises the constrained LQ deterministic MF control problem and presents the constrained
MF charging problem for a large populations of heterogeneous PEVs. Section VI concludes the
paper and highlights several possible extensions and applications. Appendix A presents some
background definitions and results from operator theory; Appendix B justifies the use of finite-
horizon formulations to approximate infinite-horizon discounted-cost ones; Appendix C contains
all the proofs of the main results.
Notation
R, R>0, R≥0 respectively denote the set of real, positive real, non-negative real numbers;
N denotes the set of natural numbers; Z denotes the set of integer numbers; for a, b ∈ Z,
a ≤ b, Z[a, b] := [a, b] ∩ Z. A> ∈ Rm×n denotes the transpose of A ∈ Rn×m. Given vec-
tors x1, . . . , xT ∈ Rn, [x1; · · · ;xT ] ∈ RnT denotes
[
x>1 , · · · , x>T
]> ∈ RnT . Given matrices
A1, . . . , AM , diag (A1, . . . , AM) denotes the block diagonal matrix with A1, . . . , AM in block
diagonal positions. With Sn we denote the set of symmetric n×n matrices; for a given Q ∈ Rn×n,
the notations Q  0 (Q < 0) and Q ∈ Sn0 (Q ∈ Sn<0) denote that Q is symmetric and has positive
(non-negative) eigenvalues. We denote by HQ, with Q  0, the Hilbert space Rn with inner
product 〈·, ·〉Q : Rn×Rn → R defined as 〈x, y〉Q := x>Qy, and induced norm ‖·‖Q : Rn → R≥0
defined as ‖x‖Q :=
√
x>Qx. A mapping f : Rn → Rn is Lipschitz in HQ if there exists L > 0
such that ‖f(x)− f(y)‖Q ≤ L ‖x− y‖Q for all x, y ∈ Rn. Id : Rn → Rn denotes the identity
operator, Id(x) := x for all x ∈ Rn. Every mentioned set S ⊆ Rn is meant to be nonempty,
unless explicitly stated. The projection operator in HQ, ProjQC : Rn → C ⊆ Rn, is defined as
ProjQC (x) := arg miny∈C ‖x− y‖Q = arg miny∈C ‖x− y‖2Q. In denotes the n-dimensional identity
matrix; 0 denotes a matrix of all 0s; 1 denotes a matrix/vector of all 1s. A ⊗ B denotes the
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5Kronecker product between matrices A and B. Given S ⊆ Rn, A ∈ Rn×n and b ∈ Rn, AS + b
denotes the set {Ax + b ∈ Rn | x ∈ S}; hence given S1, . . . ,SN ⊆ Rn and a1, . . . , aN ∈ R,
1
N
(∑N
i=1 aiS i
)
:=
{
1
N
∑N
i=1 aix
i ∈ Rn | xi ∈ S i ∀i ∈ Z[1, N ]
}
. The notation εN = O (1/N)
denotes that there exists c > 0 such that limN→∞NεN = c.
II. CONSTRAINED LINEAR QUADRATIC DETERMINISTIC MEAN FIELD CONTROL AS
MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We start by considering a population of N ∈ N agents, where each agent i ∈ Z[1, N ] has
discrete-time linear dynamics
sit+1 = A
isit +B
iuit, (1)
where si ∈ Rp is the state variable, ui ∈ Rm is the input variable, and Ai ∈ Rp×p, Bi ∈ Rp×m.
For each agent, we consider time-varying state and input constraints
sit ∈ S it , uit ∈ U it (2)
for all t ∈ N, where S it ⊂ Rp and U it ⊂ Rm are convex compact sets.
Let us consider that each agent i ∈ Z[1, N ] seeks a dynamical evolution that, given the initial
state si0 ∈ Rp, minimizes the finite-horizon cost function
J
(
si,ui, 1
N
∑N
j=1 s
j
)
=
∑T−1
t=0
∥∥∥sit+1 − (η + 1N ∑Nj=1 sjt+1)∥∥∥2
Qt+1
+ ‖uit‖2Rt (3)
where Qt+1 ∈ Sp0, Rt ∈ Sm0 for all t ∈ Z[0, T − 1], si = [si1; . . . ; siT ] ∈ (S i1 × · · · × S iT ) ⊂ RpT ,
ui =
[
ui0; . . . ;u
i
T−1
] ∈ (U i0 × · · · × U iT−1) ⊂ RmT for all i ∈ Z[1, N ], and η ∈ Rp.
The cost function J i in (3) is the sum of two cost terms,
∥∥∥sit+1 − (η + 1N ∑Nj=1 sjt+1)∥∥∥2 and
‖uit‖2; the first penalizes deviations from the average population behavior plus some constant
offset η, while the second penalizes the control effort of the single agent. Note that the time-
varying weights {Qt}Tt=1 and {Rt}T−1t=0 can also model an exponential cost-discount factor as in
[17, Equation 2.6], e.g., Qt = λtQ and Rt = λtR for some λ ∈ (0, 1) and Q,R  0.
We emphasize that the optimal decision of each agent i ∈ Z[1, N ], that is, a feasible dynamical
evolution (si,ui) minimizing the cost J in (3), also depends on the decisions of all other agents
through the average state 1
N
∑N
j=1 s
j among the population. This feature results in an aggregative
game [2], [3], [4] among the population of agents, and specifically in a (deterministic) MF game,
because the individual agent’s state/decision depends on the mean population state [10], [19].
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6The constrained LQ deterministic MF control problem then consists in steering the optimal
responses to a noncooperative equilibrium {(s¯i, u¯i)}Ni=1 of the original MF game, which satisfies
the constraints and is convenient for all the individual noncooperative agents, via an appropriate
incentive signal. To solve the MF control problem, we consider an algorithmic setup where a
central coordinator, called virtual agent in [17, Section IV.B], broadcasts a macroscopic incentive
related to the average population state 1
N
∑N
j=1 s
j to all the agents. In other words, the individual
agents have no detailed information about every other agent, nor about their statistical distri-
bution, but only react to the information broadcast by a central coordinator, which is somehow
related to their aggregate behavior.
Formally, we define the optimal response to a given reference vector z ∈ Rp T of each agent
i ∈ Z[1, N ] as the solution to the following finite horizon optimal control problem:
(si ?(z), ui ?(z)) :=
arg min
(s,u)
J (s,u, z)
s.t. st+1 = Aist +Biut,
st+1 ∈ S it , ut ∈ U it ∀t ∈ Z[0, T − 1].
(4)
We assume that the optimization problem (4) is feasible for all agents i ∈ Z[1, N ], that is,
given the initial state si0 ∈ Rp, we assume that there exists a control input sequence ui =
[ui0; . . . ;u
i
T−1] ∈ U i0 × · · · × U iT−1 such that the sets {S it}Tt=1 are reachable at time steps t =
1, . . . , T , respectively [22, Chapter 6]. This assumption can be checked by solving a convex
feasibility problem; furthermore, the set of initial states si0 such that (4) is solvable can be
computed by solving the feasibility problem parametrically in si0.
We refer to [17, Section III] for the stochastic continuous-time infinite-horizon unconstrained
counterpart of our linear quadratic (LQ) MF game. Here we focus on a discrete-time finite-
horizon formulation to effectively address state and input constraints, by embedding them in
finite-dimensional convex quadratic programs (QPs) that are efficiently solvable numerically.
Let us now rewrite the optimization problem in (4) in the following compact form:
yi ?(z) := arg min
y∈Yi
J (y, z)
= arg min
y∈Yi
‖y‖2Q + ‖y − [ z0 ]‖2∆ + 2c>y
(5)
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7where y = [s;u] ∈ R(p+m)T ,
c := −diag (diag (Q1, . . . , QT ) ,0) ([ 10 ]⊗ η), with
Q := diag (0, diag (R0, . . . , RT−1)) , (6)
∆ := diag (diag (Q1, . . . , QT ) ,0) , (7)
and, for a given initial condition si0 ∈ Rp,
Y i := {[s;u] ∈ R(p+m)T | st+1 = Aist +Biut, st+1 ∈ S it+1, ut ∈ U it ∀t ∈ Z[0, T − 1]} . (8)
Motivated by the constrained LQ MF setup, in the next section we consider a broader class
of deterministic MF control problems. In Section V-A we then apply the technical results in
Sections III, IV to the constrained LQ MF control problem.
III. DETERMINISTIC MEAN FIELD CONTROL PROBLEM WITH CONVEX CONSTRAINTS
A. Constrained deterministic mean field game with quadratic cost function
We consider a large population of N ∈ N heterogeneous agents, where each agent i ∈ Z[1, N ]
controls its decision variable xi, taking values in the compact and convex set X i ⊂ Rn. The aim
of agent i is to minimize its individual deterministic cost J (xi, σ) , which depends on its own
strategy xi and on the weighted average of strategies of all the agents, that is σ := 1
N
∑N
j=1 ajx
j
for some aggregation parameters a1, . . . , aN ≥ 0. Technically, each agent i ∈ Z[1, N ] aims at
computing the best response to the other agents’ strategies x−i := (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN),
that is,
xibr(x
−i) := arg min
y∈X i
J
(
y,
ai
N
y +
1
N
N∑
j 6=i
ajx
j
)
. (9)
Note that the best response mapping xibr depends only on the aggregate of the other players
strategies, thus leading to a MF game setup. In classical game theory, a set of strategies in which
every agent is playing a best response to the other players strategies is called Nash equilibrium.
In the MF case, the concept is similar: if the population is at a MF Nash equilibrium, then each
agent has no individual benefit to change its strategy, given the aggregation among the strategies
of the others.
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8Definition 1 (Mean field Nash equilibrium): Given a cost function J : Rn × Rn → R and
aggregation parameters a1, . . . , aN ≥ 0, a set of strategies {x¯i ∈ X i ⊆ Rn}Ni=1 is a MF ε-Nash
equilibrium, with ε > 0, if for all i ∈ Z[1, N ] it holds
J
(
x¯i, 1
N
∑N
j=1 ajx¯
j
)
≤ min
y∈X i
J
(
y, 1
N
(
aiy +
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
))
+ ε. (10)
It is a MF Nash equilibrium if (10) holds with ε = 0. 
In the sequel, we consider the class of deterministic MF games with convex quadratic cost
J : Rn × Rn → R defined as
J(x, σ) := ‖x‖2Q + ‖x− σ‖2∆ + 2 (Cσ + c)> x (11)
where Q,∆ ∈ Sn<0, Q+ ∆ ∈ Sn0, C ∈ Rn×n and c ∈ Rn.
The three cost terms in (12) emphasize the contribution of three different contributions to
the cost function: a quadratic cost ‖x‖2Q, typical of LQ MF games [19], [17], [23], a quadratic
penalty ‖x− σ‖2∆ on the deviations from the aggregate information [17], [10], and an affine
price-based incentive 2 (Cσ + c)> x = p(σ)>x [10], [12]. Let us also notice that he agents are
fully heterogeneous relative to the constraint sets {X i}Ni=1.
Throughout the paper, we consider uniformly bounded aggregation parameters and individ-
ual constraint sets for all population sizes, which is typical of all the mentioned engineering
applications.
Standing Assumption 1 (Compactness): There exist a¯ > 0 and a compact set X ⊂ Rn such
that ai ∈ [0, a¯] for all i ∈ Z[1, N ],
∑N
i=1 ai = N , and X ⊇ ∪Ni=1X i hold for all N . 
Remark 1: The formulation in (12) subsumes the one in (5) with general Q,∆ in place of
the Q,∆ from (6), general C, c in place of 0, c in (5), general convex set X i in place of Y i in
(8), and any finite dimension n ∈ N in place of (p + m)T in (5)–(8). The notation xi replaces
yi in (5) for the (state and input) decision strategy of each agent i. 
Given the cost function in (11) and the uniform boundedness assumption, the MF game in
(9) admits at least one MF Nash equilibrium, see Definition 1, as stated next and proved in
Appendix C.
Proposition 1: There exists a MF Nash equilibrium for the game in (9) with J as in (11). 
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9B. Information structure and mean field control
We notice that to compute the best response strategy xibr each agent i would need to know the
aggregation among the strategies of all other agents, namely 1
N
∑N
j 6=i ajx
j . Motivated by several
large-scale multi-agent applications [6], [8], [9], [10], [12], [13], here we consider a different
information structure where each individual agent i has neither knowledge about the states
{xj}j 6=i of the other agents, nor about the aggregation parameters {aj}Nj=1. Instead, here every
agent i reacts to some macroscopic incentive, which is a function of the aggregate information
about the whole population, including its contribution xi as well, and is broadcast to all the
agents. Given this information structure, we assume that each agent i ∈ Z[1, N ] reacts to a
broadcast signal z ∈ Rn through the optimal-response mapping xi ? : Rn → X i ⊂ Rn defined as
xi ?(z) := arg min
x∈X i
J(x, z) (12)
where J is as defined in (11).
Moreover, let us formalize the aggregate (e.g., average) population behavior obtained when
all the agents react optimally to a macroscopic signal by defining with the aggregation mapping
A : Rn →
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 aiX i
)
⊂ Rn as
A(z) := 1
N
∑N
i=1 aix
i ?(z). (13)
Remark 2: The difference between the best response mapping xibr defining the game in (9),
and the optimal response mapping xi ? in (12) is that, while in the former an agent i can also
optimize its contribution xi in 1
N
∑N
j=1 ajx
j , in the latter the signal z is fixed and hence the
optimization in (12) is carried over the first argument of J only. 
According to the information structure described above, the MF control addresses the problem
of designing a reference signal z¯, such that the set of strategies {xi ?(z¯)}Ni=1 possesses some
desired properties, relative to the deterministic MF game in (9). Specifically, here we require the
set of strategies to be an almost MF Nash equilibrium. To solve this MF control problem, we
consider a setup where the N agents communicate to a central coordinator in a decentralized
iterative fashion. Namely, for a given broadcast signal z(k) at iteration k ∈ N, each agent i
computes its optimal response xi ?
(
z(k)
)
based only on its own constraint set X i, that is its private
information. The central coordinator then receives the aggregate A (z(k)) of all the individual
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responses, computes an updated reference z(k+1) = Φk
(
z(k),A
(
z(k)
))
through some feedback
mapping Φk, broadcasts it to the whole population, and the process is repeated.
Technically speaking, given the cost function J , the agents constraint sets {X i}Ni=1 and the
aggregation parameters {ai}Ni=1, the MF control problem consists in designing a signal z¯ ∈ Rn, for
instance via a feedback iteration z(k+1) = Φk
(
z(k),A
(
z(k)
))
such that, for any initial condition
z(0) ∈ Rn, z(k) → z¯ which generates a MF (almost) Nash equilibrium {xi ?(z¯)}Ni=1 for the original
MF game in (9).
C. Mean field Nash equilibrium in the limit of infinite population size
Since the objective of our MF control problem is to find a MF Nash equilibrium for large
population size, we exploit the Nash certainty equivalence principle or mean field approximation
idea [17, Section IV.A]. Namely, for any agent i, the problem structure is such that the contribu-
tion of an individual strategy xi to the average population behavior A is negligible. Therefore, if
z¯ = 1
N
∑N
j=1 ajx
j ?(z¯) = A(z¯), then the optimal response xi ?(z¯) approximates the best response
xibr(x
−i(z¯)) of agent i to the strategies {xj ?(z¯)}j 6=i of the other players, for large population
size N .
Formally, under the uniform compactness condition for all population sizes in Standing As-
sumption 1, the following result shows that a fixed point of the aggregation mapping A in (13)
generates a MF Nash equilibrium in the limit of infinite population size.
Theorem 1 (Infinite population limit): For all ε > 0, there exists N¯ε ∈ N such that, for all
N ≥ N¯ε, if z¯ is a fixed point of A in (13), that is, z¯ = 1N
∑N
i=1 aix
i ? (z¯), then the set {xi ? (z¯)}Ni=1,
with xi ? as in (12) for all i ∈ Z[1, N ], is a MF ε-Nash equilibrium. 
Remark 3: It follows from the proof of Theorem 1, given in Appendix C, that a fixed point
of A in (13) with population size N is a MF εN -Nash equilibrium with εN = O (1/N). Having
a uniform upper bound a¯ on the aggregation parameters {ai}Ni=1 means that no single agent has
a disproportionate influence on the population aggregation for large population size, which is a
typical feature of MF setups [19], [17], [10]. 
Theorem 1 suggests that we can design the feedback mappings {Φk}∞k=1 to iteratively steer
the average population behavior to a fixed point of the aggregation mapping A in (13), as this
is an approximate solution to the MF control problem for large population size.
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IV. THE QUEST FOR A FIXED POINT OF THE AGGREGATION MAPPING
A. Mathematical tools from fixed point operator theory
In this section we present the mathematical definitions needed for the technical results in
Section IV-B, regarding appropriate fixed point iterations relative to the aggregation mapping. For
ease of notation, the statements of this section are formulated in an arbitrary finite-dimensional
Hilbert space H, that is, in terms of an arbitrary norm ‖·‖ on Rn, but in general hold for
infinite-dimensional metric spaces.
We start from the property of contractiveness [21, Definition 1.6], exploited in most of the MF
control literature [17], [23], [10] to show, under appropriate technical assumptions, convergence
to a fixed point of the aggregation mapping.
Definition 2 (Contraction mapping): A mapping f : Rn → Rn is a contraction (CON) if there
exists  ∈ (0, 1] such that
‖f(x)− f(y)‖ ≤ (1− ) ‖x− y‖ (14)
for all x, y ∈ Rn. 
If a mapping f is CON, then the Picard–Banach iteration, k = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
z(k+1) = f
(
z(k)
)
=: ΦP–B
(
z(k), f
(
z(k)
))
(15)
converges, for any initial condition z(0) ∈ Rn, to its unique fixed point [21, Theorem 2.1].
Although commonly used in the MF game literature [17], [23], [10], contractiveness is a quite
restrictive property. In this paper we actually exploit less restrictive properties than contractive-
ness, starting with nonexpansiveness [20, Definition 4.1 (ii)].
Definition 3 (NonExpansive mapping): A mapping f : Rn → Rn is nonexpansive (NE) if
‖f(x)− f(y)‖ ≤ ‖x− y‖ (16)
for all x, y ∈ Rn. 
Clearly, a CON mapping is also NE, while the converse does not necessarily hold. Note that,
unlike CON mappings, NE mappings, e.g., the identity mapping, may have more than one fixed
point. Among NE mappings, let us refer to firmly nonexpansive mappings [20, Definition 4.1
(i)].
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Definition 4 (Firmly NonExpansive mapping): A mapping f : Rn → Rn is firmly nonexpan-
sive (FNE) if
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2 ≤ ‖x− y‖2 − ‖f(x)− f(y)− (x− y)‖2 (17)
for all x, y ∈ Rn. 
An example of FNE mapping is the metric projection onto a closed convex set ProjC : Rn →
C ⊆ Rn [20, Proposition 4.8].
The FNE condition is sufficient for the Picard–Banach in (15) iteration to converge to a fixed
point [24, Section 1, p. 522]. This is not the case for NE mappings; for example, z 7→ f(z) :=
−z is NE, but not CON, and the Picard–Banach iteration z(k+1) = f(z(k)) = −z(k) oscillates
indefinitively between z(0) and −z(0). If a mapping f : C → C is NE, with C ⊂ Rn compact and
convex, then the Krasnoselskij iteration
z(k+1) = (1− λ)z(k) + λf
(
z(k)
)
=: ΦK
(
z(k), f
(
z(k)
))
(18)
where λ ∈ (0, 1), converges, for any initial condition z(0) ∈ C, to a fixed point of f [21, Theorem
3.2].
Finally, we consider the even weaker regularity property of strict pseudocontractiveness [21,
Remark 4, pp. 12–13].
Definition 5 (Strictly PseudoContractive mapping): A mapping f : Rn → Rn is strictly pseu-
docontractive (SPC) if there exists ρ < 1 such that
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2 ≤ ‖x− y‖2 + ρ ‖f(x)− f(y)− (x− y)‖2 (19)
for all x, y ∈ Rn. 
If a mapping f : C → C is SPC with C ⊂ Rn compact and convex, then the Mann iteration
z(k+1) = (1− αk)z(k) + αkf
(
z(k)
)
=: ΦMk
(
z(k), f
(
z(k)
))
(20)
where (αk)
∞
k=0 is such that αk ∈ (0, 1) ∀k ≥ 0, limk→∞ αk = 0 and
∑∞
k=0 αk = ∞, converges,
for any initial condition z(0) ∈ C, to a fixed point of f [21, Fact 4.9, p. 112], [25, Theorem R,
Section I].
It follows from Definitions 2–5 that f FNE =⇒ f NE, f CON =⇒ f NE =⇒ f SPC.
Therefore, the Mann iteration in (20) ensures convergence to a fixed point for CON, FNE, NE
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and SPC mappings; the Krasnoselskij iteration in (18) ensures convergence for CON, FNE and
NE mappings; the Picard–Banach iteration in (15) for CON and FNE mappings.
The known upper bounds on the convergence rates suggest that a simpler iteration has faster
convergence in general. The convergence rate for the Picard–Banach iteration is linear, that is∥∥z(k+1) − z¯∥∥ / ∥∥z(k) − z¯∥∥ ≤ 1 −  [21, Chapter 1]. Instead, the convergence rate for the Mann
iteration is sublinear, specifically
∥∥z(k+1) − z¯∥∥ / ∥∥z(k) − z¯∥∥ ≤ 1−  αk [21, Chapter 4], for some
 > 0.
Note that CON mappings have a unique fixed point [21, Theorem 1.1], whereas FNE, NE, SPC
mappings may have multiple fixed points. In our context this implies that, unless the aggregation
mapping is CON, there could exist multiple MF Nash equilibria, which is effectively the case
in multi-agent applications.
B. Main results: Regularity and decentralized convergence
Using the definitions and properties of the previous section, we can now state our technical
result about the regularity of the optimal solution xi ? in (12) of the parametric convex program
in (12).
Theorem 2 (Regularity of the optimizer): Consider the following matrix inequality, where Q,∆, C
are from (12):  Q+ ∆ ∆− C
(∆− C)> Q+ ∆
 < I. (21)
The mapping xi ? in (12) is:
CON in HQ+∆ if (21) holds with  > 0;
NE in HQ+∆ if (21) holds with  ≥ 0;
FNE in H∆−C if ∆  C < −Q;
SPC in HC−∆ if ∆ ≺ C.

Remark 4: The condition ∆  C < −Q in Theorem 2 implies (21) with  = 0, in fact[
Q+∆ ∆−C
(∆−C)> Q+∆
]
= I2 ⊗ (Q+ C) + 1⊗ (∆− C)
< 1⊗ (∆− C) < 0,
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where the last matrix inequality holds true because the eigenvalues of 1 ⊗ (∆− C) equal the
product of the eigenvalues of ∆− C, which are positive as ∆− C  0, and the eigenvalues of
1 = [ 1 11 1 ], which are non-negative (0 and 2). 
We can now exploit the structure of the aggregation mapping A in (13) to establish our
main result about its regularity. Specifically, under the conditions of Theorem 2, the aggregation
mapping A inherits the same regularity properties of the individual optimizer mappings.
Theorem 3 (Regularity of the aggregation): For all i ∈ Z[1, N ], let xi ? be defined as in (12).
The mapping A in (13) is Lipschitz continuous, has a fixed point, and is:
CON in HQ+∆ if (21) holds with  > 0;
NE in HQ+∆ if (21) holds with  ≥ 0;
FNE in H∆−C if ∆  C < −Q;
SPC in HC−∆ if ∆ ≺ C.

Theorem 3 directly leads to iterative methods for finding a fixed point of the aggregation
mapping, that is a solution of the MF control problem in the limit of infinite population size.
Corollary 1 (Decentralized convergence): The following iterations and conditions guarantee
global convergence to a fixed point of A in (13), where xi ? is as in (12) for all i ∈ Z[1, N ]:
1. Picard–Banach (15) if (21) holds ( > 0) or
∆  C < −Q;
2. Krasnoselskij (18) if (21) holds ( ≥ 0);
3. Mann (20) if (21) holds ( ≥ 0) or
∆ ≺ C.

Note that convergence is ensured in different norms, namely ‖·‖Q+∆, ‖·‖∆−C if ∆  C or
‖·‖C−∆ if C  ∆; this is not a limitation since all norms are equivalent in finite-dimensional
Hilbert spaces.
We emphasize that each iterative method presented in Corollary 1 has its specific range of
applicability depending on the specific MF control problem. This allows us to select one or more
fixed point feedback iterations from the specific knowledge of the regularity property at hand.
An important advantage of Corollary 1 is that decentralized convergence is guaranteed under
conditions independent of the individual constraints {X i}Ni=1, but on the common cost function J
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in (12) only. Therefore, our results and methods apply naturally to populations of heterogeneous
agents.
Let us summarize in Algorithm 1 our proposed decentralized iteration to compute a fixed point
of the aggregation mapping A, where the feedback mapping Φk ∈
{
ΦP–B,ΦK,ΦMk
}
is chosen in
view of Corollary 1.
Algorithm 1: Decentralized mean field control.
Initialization: z ← z(0), k ← 0.
Iteration:
xi ?(z)← arg min
x∈X i
J(x, z), i = 1, 2, . . . , N ;
A(z)← 1
N
∑N
i=1 aix
i?(z);
z ← Φk (z,A(z));
k ← k + 1.
Note that under the conditions of Corollary 1, Algorithm 1 guarantees convergence to a fixed
point of the aggregation mapping A in (13) in a decentralized fashion. Let us also emphasize
that any fixed point of A generates a MF εN -Nash equilibrium by Theorem 1, that is not an exact
Nash equilibrium for finite population size N , mainly because only some aggregate information
z, which is related to 1
N
∑N
j=1 ajx
j , is broadcast to all the agents. In other words, we consider
an information structure where each agent i is not aware of the aggregate strategy 1
N
∑N
j 6=i ajx
j
of the other agents {xj}Nj 6=i, because this would require that, at each iteration step, the central
coordinator communicates N different quantities to the agents, namely 1
N
∑N
j=2 ajx
j to agent 1,
1
N
∑N
j 6=2 ajx
j to agent 2, up to 1
N
∑N−1
j=1 ajx
j to agent N .
C. Discussion on decentralized convergence results in aggregative games
Decentralized convergence to Nash equilibria in terms of fixed point iterations has been
studied in aggregative game theory, for populations of finite size. Most of literature results show
convergence of sequential (i.e., not simultaneous/parallel) best-response updates of the agents
[2, Cournot path] [4, Theorem 2], under the assumption that the best-response mappings of the
players are non-increasing [4, Assumption 1’], besides continuous and compact valued.
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In large-scale games, however, simultaneous/parallel responses as in Algorithm 1 are compu-
tationally more convenient with respect to sequential ones. Within the literature of aggregative
games, the Mann iteration in (20) has been proposed in [3, Remark 2] for the simultaneous
(parallel) best responses of the agents. See [26] for an application to distributed power allocation
and scheduling in congested distributed networks. The aggregative game setup in these papers
considers the strategy of the players to be a 1-dimensional variable taking values in a compact
interval of the real numbers. Convergence is then guaranteed if the best-response mappings of
the players are continuous, compact valued and non-increasing [3, conditions (i)–(iii), p. 81,
Section 2].
It actually follows from the proof of Theorem 3 that the condition ∆ ≺ C implies that the
opposite of aggregation mapping in (13), i.e., −A(·), is monotone, which is the n-dimensional
generalization of the non-increasing property. We conclude that Theorem 3 provides mild suffi-
cient conditions on the problem data such that the convergence result in Corollary 1 subsumes,
limited to the quadratic cost function case, the one in [3, Remark 2].
V. DETERMINISTIC MEAN FIELD CONTROL APPLICATIONS
A. Solution to the constrained linear quadratic deterministic mean field control
In view of Theorem 1, our discrete-time, finite-horizon, constrained LQ deterministic MF
control problem from Section II reduces to finding a fixed point of the average mapping, that
is, z ∈ RpT such that
z = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x
i ?(z) =: A(z), (22)
where xi ? is defined in (4). In (22), we average the optimal tracking trajectories {xi ?(z)}Ni=1
among the whole population (that is, we take a1 = · · · = aN = 1 in (13), so that Assumption 1 is
satisfied with a¯ = 1) and we require the trajectory z to equal such average. For large population
size, the interpretation is that each agent i responds optimally with state and control trajectory
xi ?(z), ui ?(z), to the mass behavior z = A(z) [17, Section I, p. 1560].
In the unconstrained linear quadratic setting, that is, X it = Rp and U it = Rm for all i ∈ Z[1, N ]
and t ≥ 0, the mappings xi ? and ui ? in (4) are known in closed form, in both continuous- and
discrete-time case, for both infinite and finite horizon [27, Chapter 11]. Using this knowledge,
if we replace
(
η + 1
N
∑N
j=1 s
j
t+1
)
in (3) by γ
(
η + 1
N
∑N
j=1 s
j
t+1
)
, for γ ∈ R small enough,
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then the corresponding mapping A from (22) is CON1 [17, Theorem 3.4], and therefore the
Picard–Banach iteration converges to the unique fixed point of A [17, Proposition 3.4].
Unfortunately, it turns out that the mapping A in (22) is not necessarily CON. We there-
fore apply the results in Section IV-B to ensure convergence of suitable fixed point iterations.
Following [17, Equation 2.6], for a given γ ∈ R, let us consider
Jγ (s,u, z) :=
T−1∑
t=0
‖st+1 − γ (η + zt+1)‖2Qt+1 + ‖ut‖
2
Rt
(23)
which similarly to (5) can be rewritten as a particular case of the cost function in (12) by
choosing Q and ∆ as in (6),
C := (1− γ)∆, (24)
c := −γ diag (diag (Q1, · · · , QT ) ,0) ([ 10 ]⊗ η).
Note that (C [z; z˜])> y = (1−γ) [z; z˜] ∆>y = (1−γ)z>diag (Q1, · · · , QT ) s for all z˜ ∈ RmT ,
therefore z˜ does not affect the optimization problem in (5) with cost function Jγ in (23). Here
we formally consider a vector [z; z˜] of the same dimensions of y just to recover the same
mathematical setting in Section IV-B.
We can now show conditions for the decentralized convergence to a fixed point of the average
mapping in (22) for the discrete-time finite-horizon constrained LQ case, as corollary to our
results in Section IV-B.
Corollary 2 (Fixed point iterations in LQ MF control): The following iterations and condi-
tions guarantee global convergence to a fixed point of A in (22), where si ? is as in (4) for all
i ∈ Z[1, N ], with Jγ as in (23) in place of J :
1. Picard–Banach (15) if −1 < γ < 1;
2. Krasnoselskij (18) if −1 ≤ γ ≤ 1;
3. Mann (20) if −1 ≤ γ ≤ 1.

B. Production planning example
Let us illustrate the LQ deterministic MF setting with a production planning example inspired
by [17, Section II.A]. We consider N firms supplying the same product to the market. Let
1If γ = 0, then the mapping A in (22) is continuous, compact valued and constant, hence CON.
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sit ≥ 0 represent the production level of firm i at time t. We assume that each firm can change
its production according to the linear dynamics
sit+1 = s
i
t + u
i
t,
where both the states and inputs are subject to heterogeneous constraints of the form sit ∈ [0, s¯i]
and uit ∈ [−u¯i, u¯i] for all t ∈ N. We assume that the price of the product reads as
p = p0 − ρ
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 s
i
)
,
for p0, ρ > 0. Each firm seeks a production level si proportional to the product price p, while
facing the cost to change its production level (for example, for adding or removing production
lines). We can then formulate the associated LQ MF finite horizon cost function as
J (x,u, z) :=
T−1∑
t=0
(st+1 − γ (η + zt+1))2 + ru2t (25)
where η := −p0/ρ, γ := −ρ, r > 0, s = [s1, . . . , sT ]> ∈ RT , u = [u0, . . . , uT−1]> ∈ RT and
z = [z1, . . . , zT ]
> ∈ RT . Given a signal z ∈ RT , each agent, i = 1, . . . , N , solves a finite-horizon
optimal tracking problem as defined in (4), with cost function J in (25). For illustration, we
consider the case of a heterogeneous population of firms where we randomly sample the upper
bound s¯i from a uniform distribution supported on [0, 10] and u¯i from a uniform distribution
supported on [0, s¯i/5]. We consider the parameters p0 = 10, ρ = 1, T = 20, and hence γ = −1.
The mapping A defined in (22) is then NE, thus the Krasnoleskij iteration in (18) does guarantee
convergence to a fixed point, according to Corollary 2.
For different population sizes N , we first numerically compute a fixed point z¯ of A using
the Krasnoleskij iteration in (18) with parameter λ = 0.5, and we hence compute the strategies
{(si ?(z¯),ui ?(z¯))}Ni=1. We then verify that this is an εN -Nash equilibrium: for each firm i, we
evaluate the individual cost J¯ i := J (si ?(z¯),ui ?(z¯), z¯) and the actual optimal cost J i ? under
the knowledge of the production plan of the other firms at the fixed point z¯. In Figure 1 we
plot the maximum benefit εN := maxi∈Z[1,N ] |J i ? − J¯ i| that a firm could achieve by unilaterally
deviating from the solution computed via the fixed point iteration, normalized by the optimal
cost in the homogeneous case with expected constraints (si ∈ [0, 5], ui ∈ [−1, 1] ∀i ∈ Z[1, N ]).
According to Theorem 1, such benefit vanishes as the population size increases.
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Fig. 1: As the population size N increases, the maximum achievable individual cost improvement
"N , relative to the optimal cost in the homogeneous case with expected constraints (si 2 [0, 5],
ui 2 [ 1, 1] 8i 2 Z[1, N ]), decreases to zero. For all population sizes, N agents are randomly
selected.
C. Decentralized constrained charging control for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles
As second control application, we investigate the problem of coordinating the charging of a
large population of PEVs, introduced in [10] and extended to the constrained case in [12]. For
each PEV i 2 Z[1, N ], we consider the discrete-time, t 2 N, linear dynamics
sit+1 = s
i
t + b
iuit
where si 2 [0, 1] is the state of charge, ui 2 [0, 1] is the charging control input and bi > 0
represents the charging efficiency.
The objective of each PEV i is to acquire a charge amount  i 2 [0, 1] within a finite
charging horizon T 2 N, hence to satisfy the charging constraint2 PT 1t=0 uit = 1>ui =  i, while
minimizing its charging cost
PT 1
t=0 pt (·) uit = p (·)> ui, where p(·)> = [p0(·), . . . , pT 1(·)]> is
the electricity price function over the charging horizon. We consider a dynamic pricing, where
2We could also consider more general convex constraints, for instance on the desired state of charge, multiple charging
intervals, charging rates, vehicle-to-grid operations. However, we prefer to keep the same setting of [10], [12] for simplicity.
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the price of electricity depends on the overall demand, namely the inflexible demand plus the
aggregate PEV demand. In particular, in line with the (almost-affine) price function in [10], [12],
we consider an affine price function p(z) := 2 (az + c), where a > 0 represents the inverse of
the price elasticity of demand and c ≥ 0 denotes the average inflexible demand. The interest of
each agent is to minimize its own charging cost 2(az + c)>ui, which however leads to a linear
program with undesired discontinuous optimal solution. Therefore, following [10], [12], we also
introduce a quadratic relaxation term as follows.
The optimal charging control ui ? of each PEV i ∈ Z[1, N ], given the price signal z =
[z0, . . . , zT−1] ∈ RT , is defined as
ui ?(z) := arg min
u∈RT
δ ‖u− z‖2 + 2(az + c)>u
s.t. 0 ≤ u ≤ U i, 1>u = γi,
(26)
where δ > 0 and U i ∈ RT≥0 is a vector of desired upper bounds on the charging inputs. Note
that the perturbation δ > 0 should be chosen small to approximate the original linear cost
2(az + c)>ui. We refer to [12, Section V] for a numerical evidence of the beneficial effect of
choosing a small δ > 0 for the perturbed cost in (26).
In view of Theorem 1, a solution to the corresponding MF control problem is a fixed point
of the mapping
A(z) := 1
N
∑N
i=1 u
i ?(z) (27)
which represents the average among the optimal charging control inputs {ui ?(z)}Ni=1.
Since the cost function in (26) is a particular case of the general cost function in (12), namely
with Q = 0, ∆ = δI , C = aI , we can establish conditions on δ > 0 under which a specific
fixed point iteration, that in this context represents a price update feedback law, converges to a
MF almost-Nash solution for the constrained charging control problem. In particular, the Mann
iteration in (20) always converges to a fixed point of the aggregation mapping and hence solves
the constrained deterministic MF control problem in the limit of infinite population size.
Corollary 3 (Decentralized PEV charging control): The following iterations and conditions
guarantee global convergence to a fixed point of A in (27), where ui ? is as in (26) for all
i ∈ Z[1, N ]:
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1. Picard–Banach (15) if δ > a/2;
2. Krasnoselskij (18) if δ ≥ a/2;
3. Mann (20) if δ > 0.

In [10], only the Picard–Banach iteration is considered, for some values of δ > a/2. For small
values of δ, it is shown in both [10] and [12] that the Picard–Banach iteration causes permanent
price oscillations. On the other hand, in [12] it is observed in simulation that the Mann iteration
does converge. Corollary 3 hence provides theoretical support for this observation.
Using the same numerical values as in [10], Figure 2 shows that, if we choose the parameter
δ > 0 small enough, we recover the valley-filling solution, desirable in the case without charging
upper bounds [10, Lemma 3.1]. For the same case, we show in Figure 3 that the Picard–Banach
iteration oscillates indefinitely, while the Mann iteration converges.
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Fig. 2: Charging setting without upper bounds (  = 10 4): the Mann iteration converges to a
desirable valley-filling solution.
We refer to [12] for further discussions and numerical simulations. Application to realistic
PEV case studies is topic of current work.
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Fig. 3: Charging setting without upper bounds (  = 10 4): the Picard–Banach iteration oscillates
in a limit cycle while the Mann iteration converges to a desirable valley-filling solution z?.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Conclusion
We have considered mean field control approaches for large populations of systems, consisting
of agents with different individual behaviors, constraints and interests, and affected by the
aggregate behavior of the overall population. We have addressed mean field control theory for
problems with heterogeneous convex constraints, for instance arising from agents with linear
dynamics subject to convex state and control constraints. We have proposed several model-free
decentralized feedback iterations for constrained mean field control problems, as summarized in
Table I, with guaranteed global convergence to a mean field Nash equilibrium for large population
sizes. We believe that our methods and results open several research directions in mean field
control theory and inspire novel methods to various applications.
Outlook on extensions and applications
Most of the mathematical results from operator theory we adopted for finite-dimensional
Euclidean spaces, also hold for infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Therefore, our technical
results can be potentially extended to infinite-horizon MF control problems.
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TABLE I: Conditions on the problem data, corresponding regularity properties of the aggregation
mapping and iterations that ensure convergence to a fixed point of the aggregation mapping.
Constrained deterministic MF control with quadratic cost (Sections III, IV)
Feedback iterations
Condition Property Picard–Banach Krasnoselskij Mann[
Q+∆ ∆−C
(∆−C)> Q+∆
]
 0 CON X X X
∆  C < −Q FNE X X X[
Q+∆ ∆−C
(∆−C)> Q+∆
]
< 0 NE X X
∆ ≺ C SPC X
Constrained LQ deterministic MF control (Sections II, V-A)
Feedback iterations
Condition Property Picard–Banach Krasnoselskij Mann
−1 < γ < 1 CON X X X
−1 ≤ γ ≤ 1 NE X X
Constrained MF PEV charging control (Section V-C)
Feedback iterations
Condition Property Picard–Banach Krasnoselskij Mann
δ > a/2 CON X X X
δ ≥ a/2 NE X X
δ > 0 SPC X
We have considered agents with homogeneous cost functions, coupled via the aggregate
population behavior. The cases of heterogeneous cost functions and couplings in the constraints
are possible generalizations, motivated by setups where different agents may have different local
interests and local mutual constraints. Since we have considered agents with a strictly-convex
quadratic cost function, a valuable generalization would be the case of general convex cost
function.
May 19, 2015 DRAFT
24
As we have addressed a deterministic setting, inspired by the deterministic agent dynamics
in [10], [19], a valuable extension would be a stochastic setting in the presence of state and
input constraints. For instance, the parameters of each agent can be thought as extracted from a
probability distribution [17, Section V], and/or a zero-mean random input can enter linearly in
the dynamics [17, Equation 2.1].
The concept of social global optimality has not been considered in this paper. Following the
lines of [23, Section IV], it would be valuable to show, under suitable technical conditions,
that the MF structure allows one to coordinate efficiently decentralized constrained optimization
schemes.
Our constrained MF setup can be also extended in many transverse directions. For instance,
the effect of local heterogeneous constraints can be studied in MF games with leader-follower
(major-minor) agents [28] and in coalition formation MF games [29]. Furthermore, we believe
that our constrained setting and methods can be also exploited in network games with local
interactions [30], [31].
Applications of our methods and results include decentralized control and game-theoretic coor-
dination in large-scale systems. Among others, application domains that can be further explored
in view of our constrained MF setup are dynamic demand-side management of aggregated loads
in power grids [6], [8], [7], [9], congestion control over networks [13], synchronization and
frequency regulation among populations of coupled oscillators [14], [15]. Another application
field suited for our constrained MF control approach is the supply-demand regulation in energy
markets, where agents with heterogeneous behaviors and interests, wish to efficiently buy and/or
sell services and energy [32].
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APPENDIX
A. Further mathematical tools from operator theory
In this section, we present some useful operator theory definitions, adapted to finite-dimensional
Hilbert spaces from [20], [21]. For completeness, we present the most general known fixed point
iteration, that is, the Ishikawa iteration in (29), which guarantees convergence to a fixed point
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of a (non-strictly) PseudoContractive (PC) mapping [21, Theorem 5.1], as formalized next [21,
Remark 3, pp. 12–13].
Definition 6 (PseudoContractive mapping): A mapping f : Rn → Rn is pseudocontractive
(PC) in HP if
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P ≤ ‖x− y‖2P + ‖f(x)− f(y)− (x− y)‖2P (28)
for all x, y ∈ Rn. 
If a mapping f : C → C is PC and Lipschitz in HP , with C ⊆ Rn compact and convex, then
the Ishikawa iteration
z(k+1) = (1− αk)z(k) + αkf
(
(1− βk)z(k) + βkf
(
z(k)
))
(29)
where (αk)
∞
k=0, (βk)
∞
k=0 are such that 0 ≤ αk ≤ βk ≤ 1 ∀k ≥ 0, limk→∞ βk = 0 and∑∞
k=0 αkβk = ∞, converges, for any initial condition z(0) ∈ C, to a fixed point of f [21,
Theorem 5.1].
We notice that an SPC mapping is PC as well, therefore the Ishikawa iteration in (29) can
be used in place of the Mann iteration in Corollary 1. However, unlike the Mann iteration, in
general there is no known convergence rate for the Ishikawa iteration, and in fact the convergence
is usually much slower compared to the Mann iteration. In this paper we have considered MF
problems in which the aggregation mapping is at least SPC; an open question is whether there
exist MF problems in which the aggregation mapping is PC, but not SPC, so that the Ishikawa
iteration becomes necessary.
As exploited in the proofs of the main results, both SPC in Definition 5 and PC in Definition
6 can be characterized in terms of monotone mappings, according to the following definitions
and results [21, Definition 1.14, p. 13], [20, Definition 20.1].
Definition 7 (Monotone mapping): A mapping f : Rn → Rn is strongly monotone (SMON)
in HP if there exists  > 0 such that
(f(x)− f(y))> P (x− y) ≥  ‖x− y‖2P (30)
for all x, y ∈ Rn. It is monotone (MON) in HP if (30) holds with  = 0. 
Lemma 1: If f : Rn → Rn is MON in HP and g : Rn → Rn is SMON in HP , then f + g is
SMON in HP . 
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Proof: It follows from Definition 7 that there exists  > 0 such that, for all x, y ∈ Rn:
(f(x) + g(x)− (f(y) + g(y)))> P (x− y)
= (f(x)− f(y))> P (x− y) + (g(x)− g(y))> P (x− y)
≥  ‖x− y‖2P .
Remark 5: f FNE =⇒ f MON [20, Example 20.5]; f PC ⇐⇒ Id− f MON [20, Example
20.8]. 
Lemma 2: For any f : Rn → Rn, the mapping Id − f is SPC in HP if and only if there
exists  > 0 such that (f(x)− f(y))> P (x− y) ≥  ‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P for all x, y ∈ Rn. If f is
Lipschitz continuous and SMON in HP , then Id− f is SPC in HP . 
Proof: By Definition 5, Id−f is SPC if there exists ρ < 1 such that ‖f(x)− f(y)− (x− y)‖2P ≤
‖x− y‖2P +ρ ‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P for all x, y ∈ Rn. Equivalently, since ‖f(x)− f(y)− (x− y)‖2P =
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P + ‖x− y‖2P − 2 (f(x)− f(y))> P (x− y), we have
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P − 2 (f(x)− f(y))> P (x− y) ≤ ρ ‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P
⇐⇒ 1−ρ
2
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P ≤ (f(x)− f(y))> P (x− y)
for all x, y ∈ Rn, which proves the first statement with  = 1−ρ
2
. If f is Lipschitz and SMON then
there exist L,  > 0 such that  ‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P ≤ L ‖x− y‖2P ≤ L (f(x)− f(y))> P (x − y)
for all x, y ∈ Rn. Therefore, we have (f(x)− f(y))> P (x − y) ≥ 
L
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P , which
implies that Id− f is SPC from the previous part of the proof.
Regularity of affine mappings
We next present necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize the regularity of affine
mappings. Some of these equivalences are exploited in Appendix C. The statements could be
further exploited to show which fixed point iteration can be used to solve the unconstrained LQ
deterministic MF control problem from Section V-A.
Lemma 3 (Regularity of affine mappings): The following equivalencies hold true for any map-
ping f : Rn → Rn defined as f(x) := Ax+ b, for some A ∈ Rn×n and b ∈ Rn.
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1. CON in HP ⇐⇒ A>PA− P ≺ 0
2. NE in HP ⇐⇒ A>PA− P 4 0
3. FNE in HP ⇐⇒ 2A>PA 4 A>P + PA
4. SMON in HP ⇐⇒ A>P + PA  0
5. MON in HP ⇐⇒ A>P + PA < 0
6. PC in HP ⇐⇒ A>P + PA 4 2P

Proof: The mapping f is CON in HP if and only if there exists  ∈ (0, 1] such that
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P = ‖A(x− y)‖2P ≤ (1− )2 ‖x− y‖2P for all x, y ∈ Rn;
equivalently, (x− y)>A>PA (x− y) ≤ (1 − )2 (x− y)> P (x− y) for all x, y ∈ Rn, that is
A>PA 4 (1 − )2 P ⇔ A>PA − P 4 −(2 − 2)P . Since P  0, the existence of  > 0
such that the latter matrix inequality holds is equivalent to the existence of ε > 0 such that
A>PA−P 4 −εI . An analogous proof with  = ε = 0 shows that the mapping f is NE in HP
if and only if A>PA− P 4 0.
The mapping f is FNE in HP if and only if ‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P = ‖A(x− y)‖2P ≤ ‖x− y‖2P −
‖f(x)− f(y)− (x− y)‖2P for all x, y ∈ Rn. Equivalently, we get (x− y)>A>PA (x− y) ≤
(x− y)> P (x− y) − (x− y)> (A− I)> P (A− I) (x− y) for all x, y ∈ Rn, that is A>PA 4
P − (A− I)>P (A− I) = P − A>PA+ A>P + PA− P ⇔ 2A>PA 4 A>P + PA.
The mapping f is SMON inHP if and only if there exists  > 0 such that (f(x)− f(y))> P (x−
y) = (x − y)>A>P (x − y) ≥  ‖x− y‖2P = (x − y)>P (x − y) for all x, y ∈ Rn, that is
equivalent to 1
2
(
A>P + PA
)
< P . Since P  0, the existence of  > 0 such that the latter
matrix inequality holds is equivalent to the existence of ε > 0 such that A>P + PA < εI .
An analogous proof with  = ε = 0 shows that the mapping f is MON in HP if and only if
A>P + PA < 0.
The mapping f is PC in HP if and only if ‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P = ‖A(x− y)‖2P ≤ ‖x− y‖2P +
‖f(x)− f(y)− (x− y)‖2P = ‖x− y‖2P +‖(A− I)(x− y)‖2P for all x, y ∈ Rn. Equivalently, we
get (x− y)>A>PA (x− y) ≤ (x− y)> P (x− y) + (x− y)> (I −A)>P (I −A) (x− y) for all
x, y ∈ Rn, that is A>PA 4 P + (I −A)>P (I −A) = 2P − (A>P + PA) +A>PA and hence
A>P + PA 4 2P .
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B. Finite-horizon approximation of infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimal control problems
Let us consider continuous and convex stage-cost functions {`t : (×tτ=1Xτ )→ R≥0}∞t=1, where
for all t ∈ N, t ≥ 1, Xt ⊆ X ⊂ Rn is compact and convex, for some compact set X . Consider the
infinite-dimensional set S := ×∞t=1Xt = X1×X2×. . ., β ∈ (0, 1), and the function J∞ : S → R≥0
defined as
J∞ ({xt}∞t=1) :=
∑∞
t=1 β
t`t ({xτ}tτ=1) . (31)
Let us also define
J?∞ := inf
y∈S
J∞(y), x?∞ := arg min
y∈S
J∞(y), (32)
where we assume that the infimum J?∞ is attained in a unique point x
?
∞ ∈ S.
Analogously, let us define the finite-dimensional counterparts of the above quantities. We
consider ST := ×Tt=1Xt ⊆ X T ⊂ (Rn)T , JT : ST → R≥0 defined as
JT
({xt}Tt=1) := ∑Tt=1 βt`t ({xτ}tτ=1) , (33)
besides the optimal value J?T and optimizer x
?
T , assumed to be unique:
J?T := min
x∈ST
JT (x), x
?
T := arg min
x∈ST
JT (x). (34)
We next show that if T is chosen large enough, then J?T gets arbitrarily close to J
?
∞.
Proposition 2 (Finite-horizon approximation): Let J?∞, J
?
K be as in (32), (33), respectively.
Then lim
T→∞
|J?T − J?∞| = 0. 
Proof: Let (x?∞)t denote the component t of x
?
∞, which we rewrite as x
?
∞ = {(x?∞)t}∞t=1.
We start from the following inequalities:
J?T ≤ JT
(
{(x?∞)t}Tt=1
)
≤ J?∞
= JT
(
{(x?∞)t}Tt=1
)
+
∑∞
t=T+1 β
t`t ({(x?∞)τ}tτ=1)
≤ J?T +
∑∞
t=T+1 β
t`t ({yτ}tτ=1)
where, for all τ ≥ 1, yτ := (x?T )τ ∈ Xτ if τ ∈ Z[1, T ], yt := (x?∞)τ ∈ Xτ if τ ≥ T + 1. Now
define L := supt≥1 supξ∈X t `t(ξ), and notice that L <∞ as the functions {`t}t≥1 are continuous
and X is compact. We then have
0 ≤ J?∞ − J?T ≤ L
∑∞
t=T+1 β
t ≤ L
1−ββ
T+1 T→∞−→ 0,
from which we conclude that limT→∞ |J?T − J?∞| = 0.
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In presence of an exponential cost-discount factor in the cost as in [17, Equation 2.2], [23,
Equation 2], Proposition 2 suggests that a finite-horizon formulation can approximate a MF
ε-Nash equilibrium relative to an infinite-horizon one. The formalization of such claim, under
appropriate regularity conditions, is left as future work.
C. Main proofs
We start from the characterization of the optimal solution of (12).
Lemma 4 (Parametric optimizer): The unconstrained optimizer in (12) is
xˆ?(z) := arg min
x∈Rn
J(x, z) = (Q+ ∆)−1 ((∆− C)z − c) ; (35)
the (constrained) optimizer in (12) reads as
xi ?(z) = arg min
x∈X i
J(x, z) = ProjQ+∆X i (xˆ
?(z)). (36)

Proof: The closed-form expression of the (unique) unconstrained optimizer xˆ?(z) directly
follows from the equation 0 = ∂
∂x
J(x, z) = ∂
∂x
(
x>Qx+ (x− z)>∆(x− z) + 2 (Cz + c)> x
)
=
2x>Q+ 2(x− z)>∆ + 2 (Cz + c)>. Then the following equalities hold:
ProjQ+∆X i (xˆ
?(z)) = arg min
y∈X i
‖y − xˆ?(z)‖2Q+∆
= arg min
y∈X i
(
y − (Q+ ∆)−1 ((∆− C)z − c))> (Q+ ∆)·
· (y − (Q+ ∆)−1 ((∆− C)z − c))
= arg min
y∈X i
y>(Q+ ∆)y − 2y> ((∆− C)z − c)
= arg min
y∈X i
y>Qy + y>∆y − 2y>∆z + 2 (Cz + c)> y
= arg min
y∈X i
y>Qy + (y − z)>∆(y − z) + 2 (Cz + c)> y
= xi ?(z).
Remark 6: Since the mapping xˆ? in (35) is affine and hence Lipschitz, and the projection
operator ProjQ+∆X i has Lipschitz constant 1 in HQ+∆ [20, Proposition 4.8], both mappings xˆ?(·)
and xi ?(·) = ProjQ+∆X i (xˆ?(·)) in (12) are Lipschitz with the same constant. 
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Proof of Proposition 1
It follows from Definition 1 that a set of strategies {x¯i ∈ X i}Ni=1 is a MF Nash equilibrium
if, for all i ∈ Z[1, N ],
x¯i = arg miny∈X i J
(
y, 1
N
aiy +
1
N
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
)
= xibr(x¯
−i) =: arg miny∈X i J¯
(
y, 1
N
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
)
,
where the cost function J¯ is quadratic as well. Note that, for each i ∈ Z[1, N ], the quantity
1
N
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j can be written as
1
N
[a1In, . . . , ai−1In, 0, ai+1In, . . . , aNIn]
[
x¯1; . . . ; x¯N
]
=
([
a1
N
, . . . , ai−1
N
, 0, ai+1
N
, . . . , aN
N
]⊗ In) [x¯1; . . . ; x¯N]
=
(
a>−i ⊗ In
) [
x¯1; . . . ; x¯N
]
,
where we define a>−i :=
[
a1
N
, . . . , ai−1
N
, 0, ai+1
N
, . . . , aN
N
] ∈ R1×N for all i ∈ Z[1, N ]. Conse-
quently, {x¯i ∈ X i}Ni=1 is a MF Nash equilibrium if and only if
x¯1
...
x¯N
 =

arg miny∈X 1 J¯
(
y,
(
a>−1 ⊗ In
) [ x¯1...
x¯N
])
...
arg miny∈XN J¯
(
y,
(
a>−N ⊗ In
) [ x¯1...
x¯N
])

.
Equivalently, {x¯i ∈ X i}Ni=1 is a MF Nash equilibrium if and only if
[
x¯1; . . . ; x¯N
]
is a fixed point
of the continuous mapping 
arg miny∈X 1 J¯
(
y,
(
a>−1 ⊗ In
)
(·))
...
arg miny∈XN J¯
(
y,
(
a>−N ⊗ In
)
(·))

from RnN to the compact set ×Ni=1X i ⊂ RnN . The existence of a fixed point of the latter
mapping, and equivalently the existence of a MF Nash equilibrium, then follows from [33,
Theorem 4.1.5(b)]. 
Proof of Theorem 1
From Lemma 4 we have that xi ?(z) = ProjQ+∆X i
(
(Q+ ∆)−1 ((∆− C)z − c)), that is the
metric projection (in the Euclidean space HQ+∆) onto the compact and convex set X i of the
May 19, 2015 DRAFT
31
affine mapping z 7→ (Q+ ∆)−1 ((∆− C)z − c). Therefore the mappings {xi ?}Ni=1 are Lipschitz
with the same constant, that is, there exists L > 0 such that ‖xi ?(v)− xi ?(w)‖∞ ≤ L ‖v − w‖∞
for all v, w ∈ Rn and for all i ∈ Z[1, N ].
Now, J in (12) is a quadratic function and takes values on a compact subset of Rn × Rn,
therefore it is Lipschitz, and hence there exists M > 0 such that
|J(v, z1)− J(w, z2)| ≤M (‖v − w‖∞ + ‖z1 − z2‖∞) for all v, w ∈ Rn, z1, z2 ∈ Rn. Let us also
define D := maxv,w∈X ‖v − w‖∞, where X ⊇ ∪N≥0 ∪Ni=1 X i is compact from Assumption 1.
We now consider an arbitrary fixed point z¯ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 aix
i ?(z¯) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 aix¯
i of the aggre-
gation mapping A in (13). We show that an arbitrary agent i can improve its cost only by an
amount ε = εN = O (1/N) if we fix the strategies {x¯j := xj ?(z¯)}Nj 6=i of all other agents. Let
x˜i ? denote the optimal strategy for agent i given the strategies of the others {x¯j}Nj 6=i, that is, x˜i ? :=
arg miny∈X i J
(
y, 1
N
(
aiy +
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
))
, and let ˜˜xi ? := arg min
y∈X i
J
(
y, 1
N
(
aix˜
i ? +
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
))
.
Let us also define the associated costs:
J¯ i ? = J
(
x¯i, 1
N
(
aix¯
i +
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
))
= miny∈X i J
(
y, 1
N
(
aix¯
i +
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
))
,
J˜ i ? = J
(
x˜i ?, 1
N
(
aix˜
i ? +
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
))
= miny∈X i J
(
y, 1
N
(
aiy +
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
))
,
˜˜J i ? = J
(
˜˜xi ?, 1
N
(
aix˜
i ? +
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
))
= miny∈X i J
(
y, 1
N
(
aix˜
i ? +
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
))
.
Note that ˜˜J i ? ≤ J˜ i ? ≤ J¯ i ?. Then we define z˜ := 1
N
(
aix˜
i ? +
∑N
j 6=i ajx¯
j
)
and notice that
x¯i = xi ? (z¯) and ˜˜xi ? = xi ? (z˜). Therefore, the following inequalities hold true:
0 ≤ J¯ i ? − J˜ i ? ≤ J¯ i ? − ˜˜J i ? = ∣∣J (x¯i, z¯)− J (˜˜xi ?, z˜)∣∣
≤M ∥∥x¯i − ˜˜xi ?∥∥∞ +M ‖z¯ − z˜‖∞
= M
∥∥x¯i − ˜˜xi ?∥∥∞ + MN ai ‖x¯i − x˜i ?‖∞
= M
∥∥xi ? (z¯)− xi ? (z˜)∥∥∞ + MN ai ‖x¯i − x˜i ?‖∞
≤M L ‖z¯ − z˜‖∞ +
M
N
a¯
∥∥x¯i − x˜i ?∥∥∞
= a¯M (L+1)
N
‖x¯i − x˜i ?‖∞
≤ a¯M D (L+1)
N
=: εN .
(37)
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This proves that for all ε > 0 there exists N¯ε :=
a¯M D (L+1)
ε
such that the cost J¯ i ? of any agent
i at a fixed point z¯ is ε-close to its true optimal cost J˜ i ?, for all population sizes N ≥ N¯ε. 
Proof of Theorem 2
It follows from the proof of Lemma 3 in Appendix A that the unconstrained optimizer xˆ? in
(35) is CON in HQ+∆ if and only if there exist  > 0 such that ((Q+ ∆)−1(∆− C))> (Q +
∆) ((Q+ ∆)−1(∆− C)) = (∆ − C)>(Q + ∆)−1(∆ − C) 4 (1 − )2(Q + ∆) ⇔ (∆ −
C)> ((1− ) (Q+ ∆))−1 (∆− C) 4 (1− ) (Q+ ∆).
As Q+ ∆  0, by the Schur complement [34, Section A.5.5] the last inequality is equivalent
to (1− )(Q+ ∆) ∆− C
(∆− C)> (1− )(Q+ ∆)
 < 0
⇔
 Q+ ∆ ∆− C
(∆− C)> Q+ ∆
 < 
Q+ ∆ 0
0 Q+ ∆

⇔
 Q+ ∆ ∆− C
(∆− C)> Q+ ∆
 < εI2n
for some ε > 0. The proof that xˆ? in (35) is NE in HQ+∆ if and only if (21) holds with  ≥ 0
is analogous (with  = ε = 0).
Since ProjQ+∆X i is FNE [20, Proposition 4.8] and hence NE in HQ+∆, that is∥∥∥ProjQ+∆X i (x)− ProjQ+∆X i (y)∥∥∥
Q+∆
≤ ‖x− y‖Q+∆ for all x, y ∈ Rn, it follows that the composi-
tion xi ?(·) = ProjQ+∆X i (xˆ?(·)) is CON in HQ+∆ if xˆ? is CON in HQ+∆, NE in HQ+∆ if xˆ? is
NE in HQ+∆.
For the rest of the proof, we need the following fact, adapted from [20, Proposition 4.2 (iv)].
Lemma 5: A mapping f : Rn → Rn is FNE in HP , P ∈ Sn0, if and only if
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P ≤ (x− y)> P (f(x)− f(y)) (38)
for all x, y ∈ Rn. 
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Proof: From Definition 4, we have f FNE if and only if, for all x, y ∈ Rn,
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P ≤ ‖x− y‖2P − ‖(x− y)− (f(x)− f(y))‖2P
= ‖x− y‖2P −(
‖x− y‖2P + ‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P − 2 (x− y)> P (f(x)− f(y))
)
= −‖f(x)− f(y)‖2P + 2 (x− y)> P (f(x)− f(y)) ,
and equivalently (38).
From [20, Proposition 4.8] we have that ProjPC is FNE in HP , hence by Lemma 5:∥∥ProjPC (x˜)− ProjPC (y˜)∥∥2P ≤ (x˜− y˜)> P (ProjPC (x˜)− ProjPC (y˜)) (39)
for all x˜, y˜ ∈ Rn. Therefore, with x˜ := Ax + b and y˜ := Ay + b, the FNE condition in (39)
implies that∥∥ProjPC (Ax+ b)− ProjPC (Ay + b)∥∥2P ≤ (x− y)>A>P (ProjPC (Ax+ b)− ProjPC (Ay + b)) (40)
for all x, y ∈ Rn.
Now, since xi ?(z) = ProjQ+∆X i (xˆ(z)) = Proj
Q+∆
X i ((Q+ ∆)
−1 ((∆− C)z − c)) from (12), let
us consider (40) with Q + ∆ in place of P , (Q + ∆)−1(∆ − C) in place of A, −(Q + ∆)−1c
in place of b, X i in place of C, and v, w in place of x, y. We hence obtain
0 ≤ ∥∥xi ?(v)− xi ?(w)∥∥2
Q+∆
≤ (v − w)> (∆− C)> (xi ?(v)− xi ?(w)) (41)
for all v, w ∈ Rn.
If Q+∆ < ∆−C  0, i.e., −Q 4 C ≺ ∆, then ‖x?(v)− x?(w)‖2∆−C ≤ ‖x?(v)− x?(w)‖2Q+∆
for all v, w ∈ Rn. Therefore, it follows from (41) that
‖x?(v)− x?(w)‖2∆−C ≤ (v − w)> (∆− C) (x?(v)− x?(w))
for all v, w ∈ Rn, which is equivalent to x? being FNE in H∆−C by Lemma 5.
On the other hand, from (41) we get
0 ≤ (x?(w)− x?(v))> (C −∆) (v − w)
for all v, w, which for C−∆  0 is equivalent to −x?(·) being MON in HC−∆ by Definition 7.
We now notice that Id(·) is a SMON mapping by Definition 7; hence Id−x?, sum of SMON and
MON mappings, is SMON in HC−∆ by Lemma 1. It then follows from Lemma 2 in Appendix
A that Id − x? Lipschitz continuous and SMON in HC−∆ implies that Id − (Id− x?) = x? is
SPC in HC−∆. 
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Proof of Theorem 3
The mapping A in (13) is a convex hull among the mappings {xi ?}Ni=1, that are uniformly
Lipschitz in view of Remark 6, therefore A is Lipschitz continuous as well. Moreover, A is
compact valued on 1
N
∑N
i=1 aiX i, thus it has at least one fixed point [33, Theorem 4.1.5(b)].
It follows from Theorem 2 that if −Q 4 C ≺ ∆ then, for all i ∈ Z[1, N ], the mapping xi ?(·)
is FNE in H∆−C . Therefore, A(·) = 1N
∑N
i=1 aix
i ?(·), convex combination of FNE mappings, is
FNE as well [20, Example 4.31]. Analogously, the convex combination of CON (NE) mappings
is CON (NE) as well.
For the SPC case, if ∆ ≺ C then it follows from the proof of Theorem 2 that, for all
i ∈ Z[1, N ], Id− xi ? is SMON in HC−∆, see Definition 7. Then it follows from Lemma 1 that
1
N
∑N
i=1 ai (Id(·)− xi ?(·)) is SMON as well, which implies that Id− 1N
∑N
i=1 {aiId− aixi ?} =
1
N
∑N
i=1 aix
i ? = A is SPC in view of Lemma 2. 
Proof of Corollary 1
From Theorem 2, if (21) holds for some  > 0, then A in (13) is CON and if −Q 4 C ≺ ∆,
then A is FNE. In both cases, the Picard–Banach iteration converges a fixed point of A [21,
Theorem 2.1], [24, Section 1, p. 522], which is unique if A is CON.
For the other two fixed point iterations, we need to consider A in (13) as a mapping from
a compact convex set to itself. This can be assumed without loss of generality (that is, up to
discarding the initial condition z(0)) since A takes values in 1N
∑N
i=1 aiX i, which is a linear
transformation of the compact convex sets {X i}Ni=1, as hence compact and convex as well [35,
Section 3, Theorem 3.1]. If (21) holds for some  ≥ 0 then A is NE from Theorem 2 and the
Krasnoselskij iteration converges to a fixed point of A [21, Theorem 3.2].
Finally, if  ≥ 0 in (21) or ∆ ≺ C hold true, then A is SPC. Therefore the Mann iteration
converges to a fixed point [21, Fact 4.9, p. 112], [25, Theorem R, Section I]. 
Proof of Corollary 2
It follows from Section V-A that the LQ optimal control problem in (4) with cost function Jγ
in (23), can be rewritten in the same format of (12) with block structured matrices
Q = diag(0, R˜), ∆ = diag(Q˜,0), C = (1− γ)∆,
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where R˜ := diag(R0, . . . , RT−1)  0 and Q˜ := diag(Q1, . . . , QT )  0. To exploit the first point
in Corollary 1, we need to consider the matrix Q+ ∆ ∆− C
(∆− C)> Q+ ∆
 =
 Q˜ 00 R˜ γQ˜ 00 0
γQ˜ 0
0 0
Q˜ 0
0 R˜

= Π>diag
([
1 γ
γ 1
]⊗ Q˜ , I2 ⊗ R˜)Π,
where Π ∈ R2(p+m)T × 2(p+m)T is the permutation matrix that swaps the second and third block
columns. Since the eigenvalues of the Kronecker product of two matrices equal to the product
of the eigenvalues of the two matrices, we have that I2 ⊗ R˜  0 and that
[
1 γ
γ 1
]⊗ Q˜ is positive
definite if −1 < γ < 1, positive semidefinite if −1 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Since Π is invertible (Π>Π = I)
and hence has no 0 eigenvalues, we conclude that Π>diag
([
1 γ
γ 1
]⊗ Q˜ , I2 ⊗ R˜)Π  0 (< 0) if
−1 < γ < 1 (−1 ≤ γ ≤ 1). The proof then follows from Corollary 1. 
Proof of Corollary 3
We consider the matrix inequality (21) in Theorem 2 with Q = 0, ∆ = δI , δ > 0, and C = aI ,
a > 0. The existence of  > 0 such that δI (δ − a)I
(δ − a)I δI
 < I,
is equivalent, by Schur complement [34, Section A.5.5], to δ − (δ − a)δ−1(δ − a) > 0 ⇔
δ2 − (δ − a)2 > 0 ⇔ δ > a/2. This implies that if δ > a/2 then A is CON in HδI and, from
Corollary 1, the Picard–Banach iteration in (15) converges to its unique fixed point.
We now consider the case of δ = a/2. The condition of Theorem 2 for A being NE in HδI
is that a
2
[
I −I
−I I
]
= a
2
[
1 −1
−1 1
] ⊗ I < 0, which is satisfied because a > 0 and [ 1 −1−1 1 ] ⊗ I has
non-negative eigenvalues. The convergence of the Krasnoselskij iteration in (18) follows from
Corollary 1.
We finally consider the case δ ∈ (0, a/2). From the sufficient condition in Theorem 2, we
get that A is SPC in H(a−δ)I if δ ∈ (0, a). The convergence of the Mann iteration in (20) then
follows from Corollary 1. 
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